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I. “When Harvey Met Sally”: A Simple Introduction 
to a Complicated Problem 
 
“There is power in unity and there is power in numbers. As long 
as we keep moving like we are moving, the power 
structure . . . will have to give in.”1 
 
Once there was a man named Harvey.2 Harvey runs a 
successful public relations firm, and recently hired Sally as an 
intern. Sally was twenty-one years old, fresh out of college, and 
dreamt of running her own PR firm. Harvey told her she could 
shadow him to learn the ropes and generally help around the office. 
Sally was over-the-moon; she grew to see Harvey as a mentor. She 
happily accepts his friend request on Facebook. And she has no 
issue following him back on Instagram. She was not even dismayed 
when he randomly liked a two-year-old photo of her at the beach. 
She worked with Harvey every day, and he was always very 
friendly! 
Occasionally, her work kept her in the office later than the rest 
of the staff. On one of those nights, Harvey asked Sally if she 
wanted to have a drink in his office. She agreed, and they began to 
talk—about her hopes, dreams, family. Her love life. A couple of 
hours, and more than a few drinks later, Sally thanked Harvey and 
turned to go. But as she was leaving, she felt his hand on her 
shoulder. Then, he pressed against her. And she froze. Harvey 
asked her to stay. She squeaked out a no. And she ran.3 
Sexual harassment manifests as an abuse of power.4 
Harassers are not typically sexual deviants or addicts; they want 
 
 1. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Keep on Moving, Speech at St. Luke’s Baptist 
Church in Birmingham, Ala. (May, 1963). 
 2. Names, characters, businesses, places, events, locales, and incidents are 
purely products of the author’s imagination. Any resemblance to actual persons, 
living or dead, or actual events is entirely coincidental. 
 3. Of course, sexual harassment is rarely this cut-and-dry. While traditional 
quid pro quo harassment is the most striking—and perhaps the most focused on—
form, harassment is like a disease. It festers and grows in aberrant conditions. And, 
rather than being this explicit, can manifest as a general feeling of helplessness 
against a tirade of sexual jokes, unwanted hugs, and backhanded praise. 
 4. One study found that the three “forms” of sexual harassment—quid pro quo, 
hostile environment, and harassment by a third party—are simply manifest from 
different bases of power. Abuse of individual power leads to quid pro quo; 
organization power to hostile environment; and societal power to third-party 
harassment. Paula M. Popovich & Michael A. Warren, The Role of Power in Sexual 
Harassment as a Counterproductive Behavior in Organizations, 20 HUM. RESOURCE 
MGMT. REV. 45, 49 (2010). 
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control.5 The #MeToo movement is a natural backlash against that 
power dynamic. Men and women, many of whom feel isolated and 
alone, form a community of the harassed. Social media amplifies 
their voices; “#MeToo” collects them together.6 Though some were 
surprised at the sheer volume of stories, 7 the disenfranchised have 
always found power in community.8 
 
 5. Studies have also shown it is those who are chronically denied power that 
exhibit a stronger desire to feel powerful, and thus are more likely to use sexual 
aggression towards that end. Melissa J. Williams, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, & Lucia E. 
Guillory, Sexual Aggression When Power Is New: Effects Acute High Power on 
Chronically Low-Power Individuals, 112 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 201, 204–
14 (2017). Some analysts hypothesize that is why men in supervisory roles are more 
likely to harass their female colleagues, rather than women they directly supervise: 
“harassment [i]s an ‘equalizer’ against women supervisors, consistent with research 
showing that harassment is less about sexual desire than about control and 
domination.” McLaughlin et. al, Sexual Harassment, Workplace Authority, and the 
Paradox of Power, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 625, 641 (2012). 
 6. Alyssa Milano was credited with creating the hashtag when she wrote “[i]f 
all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too’ as a 
status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.” Nadia 
Khomami, #MeToo: How a Hashtag Became a Rallying Cry Against Sexual 
Harassment, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/oct/20/women-worldwide-use-hashtag-metoo-against-sexual-harassmen
t [https://perma.cc/3KBA-B623]. However, activist Tarana Burke came up with the 
“Me Too” designator back in 2006, which she used to refer to her wider movement to 
help survivors of sexual harassment and assault. Abby Ohlheiser, The Woman 
Behind ‘Me Too’ Knew the Power of the Phrase when She Created It – 10 Years Ago, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2017, 7:38 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2017/10/19/the-woman-behind-me-too-knew-the-power-of-the-phrase-
when-she-created-it-10-years-ago/ [https://perma.cc/7NDT-QYJA]. 
 7. It is normally men, rather than women, who are surprised by these stories. 
Mario Small, a sociologist that studies support networks, believes this is partly due 
to the fact that sexual harassment is one of those incidents that is “too painful to risk 
the possibility that our confidant, the person we are very close to, might say or do 
the wrong thing . . . . [W]omen have reason to be unsure how a close male might 
respond. Many of us men have been harassed, sexually assaulted, or stalked. But for 
almost none of us is the experience as pervasive, persistent or routine as it is for 
women.” Mario Small, What ‘Me Too’ Can Teach Men Who Are Willing to Listen, 
TIME (Oct. 19, 2017), http://time.com/4988137/me-too-men-listen/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2HRN-5TAH]. 
 8. Critical theorists have long recognized the importance of community. When 
“[t]hose injured by racism and other forms of oppression discover that they are not 
alone and moreover are part of a legacy of resistance . . . . [t]hey become empowered 
participants, hearing their own stories and the stories of others, listening to how the 
arguments against them are framed and learning to make the arguments to defend 
themselves.” Tara J. Yosso, Whose Culture Has Capital? A Critical Race Theory 
Discussion of Community Cultural Wealth, 8 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 69, 75 (2005). 
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Sexual harassment is a blight on modern society.9 And it is far 
too prevalent.10 GfK, a market-research group, and the University 
of California San Diego interviewed two-thousand men and women 
in 2017, and discovered “81% of women and 43% of men reported 
experiencing some form of sexual harassment and/or assault in 
their lifetime.”11 Thirty-eight percent of those women—and thirteen 
percent of the men—were harassed at work.12 
Yet sexual harassment remains grossly underreported.13 The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) believes 
“approximately 70% of individuals who experienced harassment” 
never file a formal complaint or speak with a supervising 
authority.14 Perhaps that is because around 75% of employees who 
speak out reported some form of retaliation.15 Regardless, the gap 
between experience and reports—as well as the high prevalence of 
 
 9. Economists typically agree that sexual harassment presents a net drain on 
resources, but it also harms people in ways that are difficult to quantify. Lynn 
Parramore, #MeToo: The Economic Cost of Sexual Harassment, INST. FOR NEW ECON. 
THINKING (Jan. 2018), https://www.ineteconomics.org/research/research-papers
/metoo-the-economic-cost-of-sexual-harassment [https:/perma.cc/9MD9-9A4A]. 
 10. These meetings do already exist—albeit post-complaint—and they are rarely 
enjoyable for those involved. Having a machine, rather than a person, prompt these 
meetings could embolden the representative. Rather than explain why a co-worker 
filed a complaint, she simply has to say the program flagged the issue, and she can 
then empathize and work through the incident with the would-be harasser. As Scalia 
once wrote “[t]he chances that frail men and women will stand up to their unpleasant 
duty are greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid shield of a firm, clear 
principle . . . .” Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1180 (1989). STOP ST. HARASSMENT, NATIONAL STUDY ON SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT 7 (Jan. 2018), http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/Full-Report-2018-National-Study-on-Sexual-Harassment-
and-Assault.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4U9-K2JP]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 8. A study from 2015 with a much smaller sample size reached similar 
conclusions. Alanna Vagianos, 1 in 3 Women Has Been Sexually Harassed at Work, 
According to Survey, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2015, 4:34 PM), https://www.huffp
ost.com/entry/1-in-3-women-sexually-harassed-work-cosmopolitan_n_6713814 
[https://perma.cc/6N6Y-PJ7Y]. 
 13. CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, SELECT TASKFORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 16 
(June 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf 
[https: perma.cc/V8B3-9E6H]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: 
Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 255 (2003). Interestingly, the authors of the study expanded 
retaliation beyond the well-studied realm of tangible workplace actions to encompass 
social retaliation, including “harassment, name-calling, ostracism, blame, threats, or 
the ‘silent treatment.’” Id. at 248. 
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retaliation—is evidence of obvious problems in sexual harassment 
law. 
But what could employers do? Around 70% of employers 
already offer training; 98% of companies have adopted a written 
sexual harassment policy.16 Yet harassment continues, even in 
companies with some of the clearest and most confidential 
reporting.17 Often humans are the root of failure—"sexual 
harassment policies . . . are only as good as the managers who 
implement them and are responsible for making sure there is broad 
compliance.”18 
This paper explores a deceptively obvious solution to human 
error; removing the human. While unthinkable even a few years 
ago, Artificial Intelligence may present a road to this end. And, with 
it, plenty of potholes and hazards to trip those with even the purest 
intentions. The law lumbers forward while technology sprints; a 
system as envisioned in this article might be inevitable, but early-
adopters must appreciate the uncharted waters they navigate. 
Section II first explores the current state of sexual harassment law, 
and why it fails the harassed. Section III then examines one 
possible solution—training Artificial Intelligence to recognize 
sexual harassment. Section IV then explores the legal implications 
 
 16. Stefanie K. Johnson, Jessica F. Kirk, & Ksenia Keplinger, Why We Fail to 
Report Sexual Harassment, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10
/why-we-fail-to-report-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/939C-W653]. 
 17. For instance, 21st Century Fox maintains a confidential sexual harassment 
hotline. And yet, despite the abundance of sexual harassment allegations now 
swirling around Bill O’Reilly, no one ever reported him using the hotline. Sarah 
Kessler, Corporate Sexual Harassment Hotlines Don’t Work. They’re Not Designed to, 
QUARTZ AT WORK (May 2, 2017), https://work.qz.com/971112/corporate-sexual-
harassment-hotlines-dont-work-theyre-not-designed-to [https://perma.cc/89YV-JWE
Q]. 
 18. Barbara Ortutay, Can Better Policies Prevent Workplace Sexual 
Harassment?, AP NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/45ff9a0e936e43
c6a9fad9f892b7872e [https://perma.cc/6X62-MLGN] (quote from Dan Eaton). Of 
course, there are plenty of other solutions. Microsoft recently rescinded forced 
arbitration of sexual harassment claims, encouraging those who experience 
harassment to seek relief. Chris Morris, Microsoft Changes Its Sexual Harassment 
Policies in the Wake of #MeToo, FORTUNE (Dec. 19, 2017, 8:33 AM), 
http://fortune.com/2017/12/19/microsoft-changes-sexual-harassment-policies/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YDG-UZ2H]. Google uses unconscious bias training to educate 
employees on recognizing issues within their own behavior. Renzo Costarella, These 
Companies Are Battling Sexual Harassment by Teaching Employees to Recognize 
Unconscious Bias, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.
com/article/305324 [https:// perma.cc/4BQY-DD5B]. And bystander training remains 
a popular option for tackling the issues of underreporting. Johnson, Kirk, & 
Keplinger, supra note 16. 
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of such a system, both in expanding sexual harassment law and its 
implications for privacy, reputation, and workplace comradery. 
 
II. “The Fault in Our Prongs”: Why Current Law Fails the 
Harassed 
 
“I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t 
even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can 
do anything . . . . Grab ‘em by the pussy. You can do 
anything.”19 
 
Title VII’s purpose is—and always was—prophylactic. 
Congress was not trying to provide victims redressability.20 Rather, 
Congress wished to “assure equality of employment opportunities 
and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which 
have fostered” barriers like those built on race and sex.21 To achieve 
that, it “arm[ed] the courts with full equitable powers” to “make 
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful 
employment discrimination.”22 Redressability would, in turn, 
“influence primary conduct” to “avoid harm.”23 Harassment costs 
businesses money, and money motivates change.24 Oddly, slightly 
misguided jurisprudence has muddled this harm-avoidance 
principle. 
A. Sexual Harassment is Not a Character Flaw 
Title VII’s language is deceptively clear—”[i]t shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s . . . sex . . . .”25 In other words, employers cannot 
 
 19. Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcrip
t.html [https://perma.cc/QAC6-LW55] (quote from Donald J. Trump). 
 20. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
 21. Id. (emphasis added). 
 22. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 
 23. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998). 
 24. See Parramore, supra note 9. 
 25. 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). Conventional wisdom holds Congress added 
sex discrimination at the eleventh hour as a joke. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The amendment adding the word 
‘sex’ to ‘race, color, religion and national origin’ was adopted one day before House 
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discriminate against someone because of their sex. But the first 
courts to adjudicate sexual harassment under Title VII grappled 
with this idea that harassment was, itself, a form of 
discrimination.26 Instead, Title VII was meant to “strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes.”27 Handsy managers, to these early courts, 
had little to do with sex stereotypes.28 
Barnes v. Train was the first opinion to consider sexual 
harassment under Title VII.29 Plaintiff “refused to engage in a 
sexual affair with her supervisor,”30 and was belittled, harassed, 
and eventually fired as a result.31 But, to the Barnes court, 
“[r]egardless of how inexcusable the conduct of plaintiff’s supervisor 
might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary barrier to 
continued employment based on plaintiff’s sex.”32 Instead, the 
harassment was a “controversy underpinned by the subtleties of an 
inharmonious personal relationship.”33 
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. was the first reported case 
considering sexual harassment under Title VII.34 Again, the facts 
outline a clear claim. Plaintiffs Corne and DeVane were clerical 
workers and “repeatedly subjected to verbal and physical sexual 
advances from defendant Price[,]” which made work so intolerable 
 
passage of the Civil Rights Act. It was added on the floor and engendered little 
relevant debate.”). However, this popular account has been revealed as a “misleading 
and harmful” reduction of hard-fought rights. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex 
Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1020 (2015). 
 26. See Barnes v. Train, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212, at *3; Corne v. Bausch & 
Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
 27. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971). 
 28. This approach, while wrong, is more conservative and evidences the Court’s 
general unwillingness to target personal behavior. Private employers were within 
the purview of the statute—private people were not. 
 29. Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimination of 
Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1007 n.3 
(1978). 
 30. Barnes, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212, at *3. The original opinion was fairly 
scant, but the appellate decision overturning Barnes is thankfully more detailed. 
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 984–86 (1977). 
 31. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 984–86. 
 32. Barnes, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212, at *3 (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). Barnes was 
not widely known until it was overturned in 1977. Instead, Corne was the first 
reported case of “a sexual harassment claim under Title VII,” and the first to gain 
any notoriety. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN 60 (1979). 
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that they left.35 But the court denied them relief, concluding “Price’s 
conduct appears to be nothing more than a personal proclivity, 
peculiarity[,] or mannerism.”36 
These courts were correct on one count—Title VII is 
prophylactic. It is meant to “make careers open to talents 
irrespective of race or sex,” rather than simply providing redress for 
injuries.37 Lawsuits are a means to that end, rather than the end 
itself. But when the company “can only be damaged by the very 
nature of the acts complained of,”38 Title VII is irrelevant as 
motivation to correct poor behavior already exists.39 
It was not until the mid-seventies that district courts began 
changing their tune. Williams v. Saxbe signaled this shift in its 
groundbreaking finding that a male supervisor’s retaliatory acts 
could “create[] an artificial barrier to employment . . . placed before 
one gender and not the other[.]”40 However, the court refused to 
equate sexual harassment and discrimination as a matter of law; 
rather, it was up to the fact-finder to determine whether 
harassment was “a policy or a regulation of the office . . . [or] an 
isolated personal incident.”41 
 
 35. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 162. 
 36. Id. at 163. 
 37. Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) 
overruled by Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
This lower court’s opinion neatly summarizes the general view of Title VII under 
early jurisprudence: 
Title VII was enacted in order to remove those artificial barriers to full 
employment which are based upon unjust and long-encrusted prejudice. Its 
aim is to make careers open to talents irrespective of race or sex. It is not 
intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to physical 
attack motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which 
happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley. 
Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556. 
 38. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
 39. The court required “discriminatory conduct . . . ar[i]se out of company 
policies” where “[t]here was apparently some advantage to, or gain by, the employer 
from such discriminatory practices.” Id. Interestingly, the Corne court’s concerns 
mirror many voiced about the #MeToo Movement: namely that “an outgrowth of 
holding such activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal 
lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances 
toward another. The only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be 
to have employees who were asexual.” Id. at 163–64. 
 40. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976). 
 41. Id. at 660. A similar decision appeared in the Fourth Circuit in Garber v. 
Saxon Bus. Prod’s, wherein the appellate court found the complaint, liberally 
construed, could show “an employer policy or acquiescence in a practice of compelling 
female employees to submit to the sexual advances of their male supervisors . . . .” 
552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). 
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The Third Circuit in Tomkins distilled the key difference 
between earlier cases and recent decisions like Saxbe, by focusing 
on adverse action.42 Harassment moves away from personal conflict 
and towards discrimination once “direct employment consequences 
flow[] from the advances[.]”43 And, in the court’s opinion, 
foreshadowed the eventual legal framework under which Title VII 
operates.44 Once (1) “a supervisor,” (2) with “actual or constructive 
knowledge of the employer,” (3) “makes sexual advances or 
demands toward a subordinate[,]” and (4) “conditions that 
employee’s job status . . . on a favorable response to those 
advances[,]” Title VII is violated as a matter of law unless (5) “the 
employer . . . take[s] prompt and appropriate remedial action after 
acquiring such knowledge.”45 
Confusion, rather than clarity, unfortunately reigned post-
Tomkins. Many courts focused unnecessarily on the harasser’s 
supervisory authority; unless the harasser expressly conditioned 
continued employment on acquiescence and had the authority to 
follow through on his threat, the harassment claim failed.46 Others 
happily permitted a Title VII claim, even when the harassment 
came from a co-worker, as long as the employer knew about it and 
did not step in.47 Inconsistent application led the EEOC to issue new 
guidelines in 1980 declaring both quid pro quo and hostile 
environment sexual harassment claims are actionable sex 
discrimination.48 
 
 42. Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1046. 
 43. Id. at 1048. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1048–49. 
 46. See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir. 1979) (dismissing 
because the plaintiff, a professor fired after refusing “to accede to the romantic 
overtures” of her academic department’s chairman, could not state a Title VII claim 
as she failed to allege the chairman had any “authority to terminate her employment 
or effectively recommend the same”); Clark v. World Airways, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15379, at *8–9 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1980) (noting “explicit sexual advances” made by a 
company’s president towards an employee were not actionable because the president 
“did not at any time relate submission to his advances to any of plaintiff’s 
employment prospects”); Smith v. Rust Eng’g Co., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14718, at 
*3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 1978) (holding that “acquiescence in the sexual advances” of a 
co-worker was not “impliedly or expressly required as a condition of employment” 
and thus Plaintiff could not base her Title VII claim on that harassment). 
 47. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 924–36 (D.N.J. 1978) 
(employer violated Title VII when it learned plaintiff’s co-workers “created an 
obscene cartoon” to “humiliate her, AS a woman,” but failed to take remedial action). 
 48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1981). 
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The EEOC identified that all of these courts were effectively 
enshrining principles of “respondeat superior . . . that an employer 
is responsible for the acts of its supervisors and agents” in a sexual 
harassment context.49 Obviously, that meant harassment by an 
employer’s direct agent imputed liability to the company. But it also 
meant the company could be liable for harassment by non-
supervisory employees, as long as the company knew about it and 
did nothing.50 
These guidelines lay the root of all modern sexual harassment 
litigation, and their dual-concerns evidences the inherent conflict 
this paper seeks to address. The guidelines’ “major thrust” is 
“[p]revention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual 
harassment.”51 Litigation was the stick; prevention the carrot. Once 
the employer “knows of acts of sexual harassment . . . and rectifies 
the actual results of those actions,” workers could no longer wield 
the stick.52 
B. The Prongs Cometh 
As noted by the Supreme Court in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, “[s]ince the Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly 
held” an employer violates Title VII either when a supervisor 
sexually harasses a subordinate, or the employer knowingly 
permits “a hostile or abusive work environment” based on sex.53 
Rectifying sexual harassment is key to removing “arbitrary 
barrier[s] to sexual equality at the workplace.”54 After all, the harm 
of sexual harassment extends beyond economic injury as “run[ning] 
a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being 
allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and 
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.”55 
 
 49. Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, 1981: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Labor and Human Res. 97th. Cong. 393 (1981) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of 
J. Clay Smith Jr., Acting Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n). 
 50. “However, where both knowledge and control do exist on the part of the 
employer, there is an obligation under [T]itle VII for the employer to maintain an 
atmosphere that is free of sexual harassment, so that members of one sex are not 
required to work under different and less advantageous terms and conditions of 
employment than members of the other sex.” Id. at 340. 
 51. Id. at 341. 
 52. As noted by the EEOC, “the Commission would not sue for a remedy which 
has already been granted.” Id. at 340. 
 53. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
 54. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)). 
 55. Id. 
 
2020] Preventing #MeToo 79 
Encouraging employers who willingly dismantle that gauntlet 
by adopting prophylactic measures, then, is a legitimate goal. And 
the legally recognized affirmative defenses to sexual harassment 
are meant to push employers down that road. Originally, employers 
had one defense—remedial action.56 Once an employer rectifies a 
problem, there is no reason to “sue for a remedy which has already 
been granted.”57 This defense still exists when a plaintiff’s co-
workers commit the harassment.58 
However, when the alleged harasser is an employee’s 
supervisor, courts disagreed on whether absolute liability attached 
under the theory of respondeat superior, or if a defense was still 
available.59 In Meritor, the Supreme Court denounced any absolute 
rule, and instead instructed lower courts “to look to agency 
principles for guidance in this area.”60 This instruction led to chaotic 
results until,61 in the late nineties, the Supreme Court created a 
new affirmative defense.62 First, it recognized absolute liability 
attached when a supervisor sexually harasses an employee, and 
subsequently takes adverse action against her.63 But, when there is 
 
 56. Hearing, supra note 49, at 351. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1986) (“With respect to conduct between fellow 
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace 
where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have 
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate 
corrective action.”). 
 59. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793 (1998). 
 60. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (1986). 
 61. The instruction led to three approaches to vicarious liability rooted in agency 
principles. An employer could be vicariously liable when (1) “supervisors were acting 
within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct”; 
(2) “they were significantly aided by the agency relationship in committing the 
harassment”; or (3) the employer had actual or constructive “knowledge of the 
harassment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775, 793. Some circuits would refuse to attach 
vicarious liability to conduct “motivated solely by individual desires and serves no 
purpose of the employer” while others focused more heavily on foreseeability and 
whether the “sexual misconduct arose from or was in some way related to the 
employee’s essential duties.” Id. at 776, 796. 
 62. This defense was explained in companion cases Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775. 
 63. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Interestingly, even post-
Ellerth, not every state patterned their sexual harassment jurisprudence on Title 
VII. Until recently, New Jersey attached strict liability to supervisor harassment 
even without an adverse employment action. Aguas v. State, 107 A.3d 1250, 1278 
(N.J. 2015) (Albin, J., dissenting) (“Until today, the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
defense standard was foreign to our . . . jurisprudence . . . [which] makes no such 
distinction between tangible employment actions and sexual harassment that may 
cause physical or psychological harm to the employee.”). 
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no adverse action, an employer may avoid liability by showing (1) 
they “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior”; and (2) “that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer.”64 
The two requirements of an Ellerth/Farragher defense creates 
different obligations for each party; for simplicity’s sake, this paper 
refers to each obligation as prongs one through three.65 The first 
prong obliges employers use “reasonable care to 
prevent . . . sexually harassing behavior.”66 Prong two mandates 
employers minimize harm once it occurs.67 And, if these prongs are 
met, prong three’s burden shifts to plaintiff to prove they either took 
advantage of preventative measures, or their failure to do so was 
reasonable.68 
C. Shouldering Your Burden  
Courts have recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination for nearly thirty years. And yet, as the #MeToo 
movement shows, harassment remains one of the largest arbitrary 
barriers to gender equality in the workplace. So what went wrong? 
Some analysts blame the defense itself. They derisively dub it 
the “file cabinet defense,” requiring employers do little beyond 
“promulgat[ing] an anti-harassment policy that specifically 
addresses sexual harassment and a grievance procedure that allows 
an employee to bypass a harassing supervisor.”69 As long as you 
 
 64. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 65. Traditionally, there are only two prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense: (1) 
The employer must use reasonable care to prevent and correct harassing behavior; 
and (2) the employee must take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. However, one of the biggest failings of 
sexual harassment law, in the author’s opinion, if this tendency to group prevention 
and correction together. Prevention must remain the end-goal; correction simply fills 
the gaps. 
 66. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08. 
 69. Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher 
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 210 (2004) (“My concern was 
well-founded. An examination of 200 federal court cases addressing the new Ellerth 
and Faragher affirmative defense reveals that many federal courts have interpreted 
the Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher to require little more than what the 
Court in Meritor commanded: promulgate an anti-harassment policy that specifically 
addresses sexual harassment and a grievance procedure that allows an employee to 
bypass a harassing supervisor. As a practical matter, the Court’s decisions in Ellerth 
and Faragher did little to change employer incentives to reduce the incidence of 
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have a file cabinet for these claims, the employee bears the burden 
of acting. A fairer assessment views this as a “notice” requirement,70 
as exists in some premises liability cases.71 A landlord has a duty to 
monitor for hazardous conditions but, as long as that duty is 
satisfied, she is not liable for injury caused by unknown conditions. 
But requiring notice is futile when employees refuse to report. 
There is a deep fear of retaliation.72 Seventy-six percent of those 
who report harassment experience retaliation, which certainly 
hinders others from reporting.73 Indeed, as one analyst notes, “if the 
vast majority of harassment victims do not report harassment, then 
the reasonable response is not to report harassment.”74 The 
reporting requirement stems from tort-principles of mitigation; a 
victim is only blameless as long as damage is unavoidable.75 Harm-
avoidance should certainly remain part of a court’s analysis, but 
current laws unnecessarily constrain harm-avoidance to formal 
reporting.76 And, as a result, many stories go unheard. 
 
sexual harassment by supervisors in the workplace.”). 
 70. The Ninth Circuit nicely summarized the notice requirement as follows: 
Notice of the sexually harassing conduct triggers an employer’s duty to take 
prompt corrective action that is ‘reasonably calculated to end the 
harassment.’ This obligation actually has two parts. The first consists of the 
temporary steps the employer takes to deal with the situation while it 
determines whether the complaint is justified. The second consists of the 
permanent remedial steps the employer takes once it has completed its 
investigation. 
Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). 
 71. The Americans with Disabilities Act provides another analogous legal 
mechanism. Designed to “eliminat[e] . . . discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities;” the ADA requires an employer provide “reasonable accommodations” to 
help a disabled but otherwise qualified individual to do their job. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) 
(2018). However, “[a]n employee has the initial duty to inform the employer of a 
disability before ADA liability may be triggered for failure to provide 
accommodations—a duty dictated by common sense lest a disabled employee keep 
his disability a secret and sue later for failure to accommodate.” Beck v. Univ. of Wis. 
Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 72. Johnson, Kirk, & Keplinger, supra note 16. 
 73. See id.; See also Cortina & Magley, supra note 15, at 255 (finding that only 
34% of those who reported harassment did not experience any form of retaliation). 
 74. Lawton, supra note 69, at 209. 
 75. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (“Title VII borrows 
from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine, . . . and the considerations which 
animate that doctrine would also support the limitation of employer liability in 
certain circumstances.”). 
 76. Margaret Johnson explores this phenomenon in depth, noting “the acts taken 
to ‘avoid harm’ from sexual harassment are more diverse than filing a formal 
complaint of sexual harassment.” Margaret E. Johnson, “Avoiding Harm Otherwise”: 
Reframing Women Employees’ Responses to the Harms of Sexual Harassment, 80 
TEMP. L. REV. 743, 771 (2007). Johnson suggests lawmakers and judges look beyond 
formal reporting mechanisms and recognize how “more complete stories can be told 
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Further, harassment is not a one-size-fits-all problem. Not all 
misconduct is actionable, nor do all employees perceive harassment 
the same way. Disagreement abounds, even within the #MeToo 
movement.77 No one really knows when, exactly, a compliment 
crosses the line into harassment.78 There are simply too many 
subjective elements. 
Scholars have proposed different solutions to these two 
problems. Some suggest a new reasonableness standard, permitting 
juries to determine the reasonableness of an employee’s failure to 
report.79 Others argue the standard should remain with the 
employer, requiring it prove it acted reasonably in trying to prevent 
harassment.80 But these solutions overlook an interesting quality of 
sexual harassment law. The interests of the employer and employee 
are not diametrically opposed. Sexual harassment harms both.81 A 
cooperative system that recognizes allies (the harassed and the 
employer) and the problem (the harasser) could solve 
underreporting. Retaliation and confusion shrink against a 
company’s vast resources and honest support. Perhaps, then, it is 






and made available for determinations pursuant to the liability framework for 
supervisor sexual harassment.” Id. at 806. 
 77. Fiona Chen, Why the Aziz Ansari Story and Discussions of Grey Areas Are 
Central to the #MeToo Movement,  TECH (Jan. 25, 2018), https://thetech.com/2018/01
/25/me-too-aziz-ansari [perma.cc/B8FM-69YV]. 
 78. Akshita Jha & Radhiki Mamidi, When Does a Compliment Become Sexist? 
Analysis and Classification of Ambivalent Sexism Using Twitter Data, PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE SECOND WORKSHOP ON NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND COMPUTATIONAL 
SOC. SCI. 7 (2017) (“Previous works on computationally detecting sexism present 
online are restricted to identifying the hostile form. Our objective is to investigate 
the less pronounced form of sexism demonstrated online.”). 
 79. Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers 
Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on 
Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 635 (2006). 
 80. Robert R. Graham III, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Need to Revisit 
the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
423, 446 (2016) (“An employee’s reporting of harassing behavior creates a rebuttable 
presumption of liability that shifts the burden to the defendant employer to prove 
that it acted reasonably in its efforts to prevent and remedy the harassment at 
issue.”). 
 81. See Parramore, supra note 9. 
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III. “Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?”: Teaching the 
Robot 
 
“Did you know that my love is a liquid? I could talk to me for 
years. I can’t speak to you at all. Did you know that friends come 
in boxes?”82 
 
At a 1956 conference at Dartmouth College, R.J. Solomonoff 
posited “[t]he finding of ‘words’ that have a high and useful 
correlation with other ‘words’ has been, by far, the most important 
task of science.”83 When someone walks outside and sees dark 
clouds, their mind will predict the likelihood of rain because it is 
hardwired to recognize patterns.84 A result—rain—is partly 
predictable based on an element—clouds. Add more elements—
temperature, time of day, geography—and a more accurate 
prediction follows. According to Solomonoff, programmers could 
theoretically create an algorithm to examine elements, identify 
corresponding results, and then issue predictions.85 
A. Making Intelligence Artificial: Algorithmic Learning 
Artificial Intelligence is an incredibly complex and eclectic 
field. Solomonoff was one of ten academics at Dartmouth, and a 
schism immediately appeared between the “rigidly logical” but 
“immediately applicable” programs, and probabilistic based 
programs.86 Systems are, in fact, still categorized as driven by either 
logic or probability.87 
 
 82. TUBEWAY ARMY, My Love is a Liquid, on TUBEWAY ARMY (Beggars Banquet 
Records 1978). 
 83. Ray Solomonoff, An Inductive Inference Machine, IRE Convention Record, 
Section on Information Theory, Part 2, at 2 (1957). 
 84. Or, put another way, “if we observe ‘cloudy weather,’ we expect ‘rainy 
weather’ in the immediate space-time neighborhood[—]and vice-versa.” Id. 
 85. “To make predictions, the machine examines the interrogation square of the 
q element, finds a p n-gram that fits the problem, and makes the prediction that 
corresponds to that p n-gram.” Id. at 14. 
 86. Grace Solomonoff, Ray Solomonoff and the New Probability, in ALGORITHMIC 
PROBABILITY AND FRIENDS, BAYESIAN PREDICTION AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 
PAPERS FROM THE RAY SOLOMONOFF 85TH MEMORIAL CONFERENCE, MELBOURNE, 
VIC, AUSTRALIA, NOV./DEC. 2011, 37, 42 (David L. Dowe ed.,  2013) (explaining that 
logic-based programs are defined by much simpler “if-then” statements; if option a, 
then result y, but if option b, result x). 
 87. See Karthik Guruswamy, Data Science: Machine Learning Vs. Rules Based 
Systems, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/teradata/2015/12/
15/data-science-machine-learning-vs-rules-based-systems/#2f5b61b2119a [https://p
erma.cc/5NX6-DSZQ]. However, many programs, like IBM’s Watson, actually use 
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The biggest drawback to purely logical programming is the 
difficulty in hard-coding knowledge.88 Our world is inherently 
complex, and accurately distilling complexity into logical rules is 
almost impossible.89 Machines needed to acquire their own 
knowledge “by extracting patterns from raw data,” much like 
humans do.90 Machine learning is now the most cutting-edge form 
of AI as it takes away the human operator, and theoretically 
permits a program to simply learn on its own.91 A machine with 
enough computing power can break down even complicated 
collections of information and, from those, extract patterns.92 
Pattern extraction is AI’s most interesting feature, 
particularly in preventing sexual harassment. AI is exceedingly 
good at mapping out extant and predicted relationships based on 
these patterns.93 Police departments have dubbed this “predictive 
policing,” as their software pores over data to predict potential 
criminals, victims, and co-offending networks.94 Credit card 
monitoring software pores through billions of transactions for 
 
both. John Rennie, How IBM’s Watson Computer Excels at Jeopardy, PLOS (Feb. 14, 
2011), http://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs6700/2013sp/readings/01-a-Watson-Short
.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7FJ-TQZ9]. 
 88. See IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING 2 (2016). 
 89. Id. at 2–3. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1–3. 
 92. Humans already do this subconsciously. Imagine, for instance, a cat. Your 
mind can generally predict how a cat looks based on your past interactions with the 
animal. But AI programs could not mimic this behavior without first being told what 
a cat looked like. Then, in 2012, researchers behind Google Brain discovered their AI 
was able to successfully compile a probabilistic image of a cat purely through pattern 
recognition after reviewing ten million random video thumbnails. Google’s team 
never told the machine that a certain object was a cat. Rather, the machine 
recognized the pattern as significant within the majority of the random thumbnails, 
and assigned its conception of a cat value. See John Markoff, How Many Computers 
to Identify a Cat? 16,000, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/201
2/06/26/technology/in-a-big-network-of-computers-evidence-of-machine-learning.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/W65S-RNHL]. 
 93. See China: Police ‘Big Data’ Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/19/china-police-
big-data-systems-violate-privacy-target-dissent [https://perma.cc/7WDW-465G]. 
 94. Social media is a treasure trove of data for predicting would-be criminals and 
mapping their relationships. See MOHAMMAD A. TAYEBI & UWE GLÄSSER, SOCIAL 
NETWORK ANALYSIS IN PREDICTIVE POLICING: CONCEPTS, MODELS AND METHODS 2 
(2016). This practice, of course, comes with its own set of problems, including the 
implicit bias inherent in any community-based prediction software. Randy Rieland, 
Artificial Intelligence Is Now Used to Predict Crime. But Is It Biased?, SMITHSONIAN 
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patterns to indicate someone is a thief or terrorist.95 The Chinese 
Government has used machine-learning programs for nearly 
everything, from planning city routes to rooting out political 
dissidents.96 
Given that a lot of companies are using AI to replace core 
functions once left to Human Resources,97 a program that similarly 
predicts sexual harassment could be a godsend. Sexual harassment 
software already has a place in corporate America. Programs 
analyze the content of e-mails to warn users away from sending 
potentially harassing messages.98 Advanced Discovery’s new 
“Riskcovery” actually uses predefined patterns of sexually 
harassing behavior to flag potential harassment.99 But the problem 
with these programs, at least from a preventative perspective, is 
they still require harassment to occur, or almost occur, before 
sending up a flag. If AI can truly vindicate Title VII’s prophylactic 
purpose, it will need to kick in earlier in the process. 
B. Can You Teach AI to be Harassed? 
Sexual harassment is predictable. Socio-cultural studies prove 
researchers can analyze social situations, personalities, and 
contextual clues to determine when sexual harassment might 
 
 95. See Robert J. O’Harrow, Jr., No Place to Hide, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 35, 45 (2005). 
 96. See Liza Lin & Josh Chin, China’s Tech Giants Have a Second Job: Helping 
Beijing Spy on Its People, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/c
hinas-tech-giants-have-a-second-job-helping-the-government-see-everything-15120
56284 [https://perma.cc/T2CY-439A]; Sam Schechner, Douglas MacMillan, and Liza 
Lin, U.S. and Chinese Companies Race to Dominate AI, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 
2018),https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-u-s-companies-may-lose-the-ai-race-151628
067 [https://perma.cc/T29Y-7UNX]. 
 97. See Jeanne Meister, The Future Of Work: The Intersection of Artificial 
Intelligence and Human Resources, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.forbes.co
m/sites/jeannemeister/2017/03/01/the-future-of-work-the-intersection-of-artificial-
intelligence-and-human-resources/2/#49c2b98c67ee [https://perma.cc/XCA4-WRBP]; 
Ted Greenwald, How AI Is Transforming the Workplace, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-ai-is-transforming-the-workplace-1489371060 
[https://perma.cc/3CZG-CRJP]; Sam Schechner, Meet Your New Boss: An Algorithm, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-your-new-boss-an-
algorithm-1512910800 [https://perma.cc/6FJY-GUSP]. 
 98. See Joanna Goodman, Legal Technology: Better Together, LAW SOC’Y 
GAZETTE, July 11, 2016, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/legal-technology-
better-together/5056456.article [https://perma.cc/KB4U-KCLS]. 
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occur.100 The trouble is reducing these highly malleable, subjective 
experiences into language understood by the program. Just as 
Google Brain had to learn the very concept of a cat,101 so too would 
an effective AI need to understand the concept of harassment. 
However, few would disagree on the very basic ingredients 
necessary in a cat.102 Many disagree as to what constitutes 
harassment.103 
Subjective experience long-confounded AI researchers as 
rudimentary AIs required binary definitions. “Honesty is good, 
dishonesty is bad” was a very simple moral game that effectively 
ignores subjective experience and context. However, with the 
advent of neural networks, there can be ranges with small upticks 
between each judgment. And it is here that researchers are having 
luck teaching AI about human culture.104 AIs have, in fact, been 
taught to accommodate human culture before determining if an act 
 
 100. See John B. Pryor et al., A Social Psychological Model for Predicting Sexual 
Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 69, 70 (1995). 
 101. See Markoff, supra note 92. 
 102. Even if you prefer dogs to cats, you and I probably agree on what a cat looks 
like. 
 103. See Wendy L. Patrick, Sexual Harassment Is in the Eye of the Beholder, 
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/why-
bad-looks-good/201703/sexual-harassment-is-in-the-eye-the-beholder [https:// perm
a.cc/PQV3-6H74]. 
 104. Researchers were able to teach a machine to mimic cultural preferences in 
negotiation using games. The goal was to move across a colored board to a ‘goal’ 
square. But moving required surrendering a chip of whatever color adjacent square 
you wanted to go to. There were three phases: negotiation, transfer, and movement. 
During the negotiation phase, a party could ask the other to surrender chips of a 
certain color. If rejected, the other side got to ask. During transfer, you could transfer 
however many chips you agreed to, or a subset of that agreement (including none), 
allowing you to break the promise. Finally, during the movement phase, you could 
move one step if you had the chips. After that, the positions alternated and the next 
round would begin. The game ended when a party either didn’t move for three rounds 
or reached its goal. The game was then scored by how close each party got to its goal. 
See Galit Haim et al., A Cultural Sensitive Agent for Human-Computer Negotiation, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS 
AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS 451, 452 (June 2012), http://www.eecs.harvard.
edu/~gal/Papers/pal.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA7T-9KUQ]. 
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is morally wrong.105 They can simulate guilt,106 flirt,107 and predict 
potential suicide risks.108 An AI can even recognize beauty and 
music, as long as those components have an assignable value.109 
Title VII is not a civility code,110 which is why a plaintiff cannot 
successfully sue over one dirty joke. But the “objective severity of 
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 
person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the 
circumstances.’”111 That standard adds a subjective element. The 
first step, then, in designing an AI program for sexual harassment 
is teaching it to accommodate subjective experience. Having new 
hires play a game with the machine could allow the program to 
assign a ‘sensitivity profile’ for each employee.112 
C. Designing “An Eye”113 Program 
This game cannot simply spit out dirty jokes or potentially 
harassing situations and ask new employees to rank their comfort 
 
 105. See Ariel Conn, Ethics and Creativity in Artificial Intelligence: An Interview 
with Mark Riedl, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.co
m/entry/ethics-and-creativity-in-artificial-intelligence-an_us_593047b4e4b09e93d7
964848 [https://perma.cc/75PY-GRS6]; Using Stories to Teach Human Values to 
Artificial Agents, GA. TECH. (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.news.gatech.edu/2016/02
/12/using-stories-teach-human-values-artificial-agents [https://perma.cc/52MB-P6
RY]. 
 106. See Simon Parkin, Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, ECONOMIST:1843 
MAG. (June/July 2017), https://www.1843magazine.com/features/teaching-robots-
right-from-wrong [https://perma.cc/PGF5-43XR]. 
 107. See Moira Weigel, Flirting with Humanity, NEW REPUBLIC (May 11, 2016), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/133034/flirting-humanity [https://perma.cc/6R4W-
VJPS]. 
 108. See Aili McConnon, AI Helps Identify People at Risk for Suicide, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ai-helps-identify-people-at-risk-for-
suicide-1519400853 [https://perma.cc/MW86-7YPW]. 
 109. AI analyzes images and art deemed popular and professional, identifies 
common patterns in the art, and then compares new images to what it found. Levi 
Manovich, Automating Aesthetics: Artificial Intelligence and Image Culture, 
MANOVICH (2017), http://manovich.net/index.php/projects/automating-aesthetics-art
ificial-intelligence-and-image-culture [https://perma.cc/8BZS-XL4X]. As the author 
points out though, relying on popular reaction may lead to cultural homogenization. 
The same application, and results, could apply to music. George Sims, Will AI 
Change the Future of Music?, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 19, 2017), 
http://www.dw.com/en/will-ai-change-the-future-of-music/a-41031406 [https://perm
a.cc/C7SE-AVYT]. 
 110. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (“Title VII, 
we have said, does not set forth ‘a general civility code for the American workplace.’”). 
 111. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 112. See Haim, supra note 104 (explaining that games are an excellent way to help 
AI programs understand cultural differences). 
 113. Please forgive the terrible pun, but the author could not resist the Orwellian 
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level.114 Rather, designers should pattern it around the very 
personality traits that indicate sensitivity to harassment. One 
study actually tracked these personality traits and linked them to 
sensitivity.115 Some findings were expected; those with a high sense 
of morality or justice may be more sensitive to harassment as they 
keenly perceive lapses in decorum.116 And people of lower 
intelligence “tend to be over-sensitive to harassment – both sexual 
and non-sexual” as they might lack “enough insight to understand 
the subtleties in human behavior” and, “[a]s a result, they may 
perceive harassment in certain behaviours when, in fact, the 
behaviour may mean something else entirely – humour, for 
example.”117 
Others were surprising. People who were naturally shy or 
withdrawn tended to be less sensitive to sexual harassment, and 
more sensitive to other forms of harassment; the authors posited 
that these individuals see sexual harassment as something 
avoidable through withdrawing from a situation, while other forms 
of harassment require immediate action.118 People who were 
outgoing and friendly were, in contrast, highly sensitive to 
harassment; the authors posited such “‘free and easy’ styles lead 
others to believe that they are not at all sensitive, and to deal with 
them more harshly than . . . others.”119 
The game, then, should test a person’s propensity for 
confrontation, problem-solving skills, and notions of justice. 
Something as rudimentary as ‘Cheat,’ wherein both sides may cheat 
or call out the other for cheating, could target these traits.120 Of 
 
reference. 
 114. This approach would effectively require new hires to endure harassing 
behavior, albeit from a machine, after being hired. 
 115. See Stephen M. Crow et al., The Impact of Personality Factors on Sexual and 
Non‐sexual Harassment Sensitivity, 10 WOMEN MGMT. REV. 9, 10 (1995). 
 116. Id. at 15–16. 
 117. Id. at 15. 
 118. Id. at 16. 
 119. Id. at 15. 
 120. For those who never played Cheat—also known as “Bullshit,” “Bluff,” and “I-
Doubt-It”—the game is very simple. The aim is for the player to get rid of all of their 
cards. Each player takes turns placing cards face down starting from Aces and 
working their way up, but they must state orally what they are purportedly placing 
in the pile. For example, the first player will say “two Aces” and place two of their 
cards on the pile. The other players may then call the first player’s bluff or the next 
player may take their turn. If a player’s bluff is called successfully, that player has 
to pick up the pile. But if the player who called you a bluff is wrong, they pick up the 
pile. 
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course, personality tests are not all created equal.121 But the more 
games the computer plays, the better the sensitivity profile 
becomes. That gives the program a base from which to judge 
patterns and relationships. Is a supervisor with low-sensitivity 
paired with an employee with high-sensitivity? That immediately 
raises a red flag, allowing a company to monitor their relationship 
closely. Being low-or-high sensitivity is not actionable, and it must 
not influence any managerial decisions,122 but rather it lets human 
resources know to watch for issues. 
The Eye—like any successful AI algorithm—would require 
massive amounts of data in order to function properly and would 
have to learn what harassment actually is before predicting its 
likelihood.123 Looking for keywords in e-mails is not enough—no one 
says “I am going to sexually harass you” in an e-mail. Instead, it 
must identify the behaviors and situations that have led to 
allegations of harassment. Programmers have trained programs 
like Riskcovery and BotlerAI to read publicly available cases and 
extract patterns from those,124 but that still requires enough 
behavior to make a case. Permitting the program to review internal 
HR files and complaints would help it understand what actually 
leads to low-level complaints. It would then supplement such a 
database, creating a centralized location for the aggregate 
scuttlebutt the program distills from corporate chatter. 
Taking this a step further, the program could even reach out 
of network to comb the internet for all publicly available 
information about a company’s employees. It can use an employee’s 
photo to identify social networks and map out relationships with co-
workers based on extant connections, photos, conversations, tags, 
and content interaction. When a Harvey profile interacts with 
three-month old content posted by a Sally profile,125 the program re-
 
 121. Whitney Martin, The Problem with Using Personality Tests for Hiring, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Aug. 27, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/08/the-problem-with-using-persona
lity-tests-for-hiring [https://perma.cc/9JKS-XAU3]. 
 122. A profile that negatively impacts a person’s career would easily lay the basis 
for a lawsuit. 
 123. Data is why AI has evolved so exponentially over the last five years. People 
put more information online than ever before, and an AI becomes better at tailoring 
its predictions when it has more data. Dave Gershgorn, Five Years Ago, AI Was 
Struggling to Identify Cats. Now It’s Trying to Tackle 5000 Species, QUARTZ MEDIA 
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://qz.com/954530/five-years-ago-ai-was-struggling-to-identify-
cats-now-its-trying-to-tackle-5000-species/ [https:// perma.cc/72NX-MXWB]. 
 124. BOTLER AI, https://botler.ai/ [https://perma.cc/KLM7-5UDL]; Riskcovery, 
supra note 99. 
 125. See the story supra Section I. 
 
90 Law & Inequality [Vol. 38: 2 
asses the risk of harassment, and potentially spits out a warning to 
HR.126 HR then may choose—or, if company policy dictates, will be 
required—to step in before harassment occurs. The Eye would track 
this network on a massive scale, monitoring the behavior and 
relationships of potentially thousands of employees.127 
However, the building blocks of such a program are rife with 
legal issues.128 This program ranks people based on subjectivity to 
sexual harassment; categorizes them as potential victims and 
harassers; consolidates mounds of highly sensitive, private 
information into one central location; and, perhaps most 
worryingly, potentially punishes people for acts never committed. 
The true limitation of such a program, then, is probably not 
technological. It is legal and, as discussed in the next section, those 
implications raise the most pressing issues concerning the adoption 
of a program like The Eye. 
IV. “The Call of Higher Duty”: AI’s Implications for Notice, 
Prevention, and Privacy 
 
“Blessed is the man who expects nothing, for he shall never be 
disappointed.”129 
 
Any AI program meant to predict and prevent sexual 
harassment—whether it looks like The Eye or something 
completely different—must exhibit three features. (1) An early 
warning system permitting intervention prior to an official report; 
(2) mapping and categorization of an organization’s employees; and 
(3) consumption of massive amounts of data. 
A. Resurrecting the Duty to Prevent 
As discussed above, the Ellerth/Faragher defense requires 
employers use reasonable care to (1) prevent and (2) correct 
 
 126. Professor Richard Paul kindly referred to this as a “de Haan warning,” which 
is certainly more palatable than “thought crime.” 
 127. Such a victim-focused solution would also permit HR to check in with the 
potential harassed to ensure they have not perceived any harassment and help build 
trust between HR and employees. 
 128. One could probably transplant the basic components of the author’s program 
and put it in a law school exam to test a student’s ability to issue spot. 
 129. Letter from Alexander Pope to William Fortescue (Sept. 23, 1725), in THE 
WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE: CORRESPONDENCE 104 (comp. by John Wilson Croker, 
Vol. IX 1886). 
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“sexually harassing behavior.”130 Plenty of ink has spilled on the 
latter requirement, but the former—despite Title VII’s prophylactic 
purpose—remains largely unchanged. Artificial intelligence may 
change that by (1) creating a duty to monitor, and (2) expanding an 
employer’s duty to warn. 
i. Duty to Monitor 
Nearly all federal courts have concluded employers satisfy 
their preventative obligations simply by creating and disseminating 
anti-harassment policies.131 Judges prefer “concentrat[ing] on 
‘simple, quantifiable standards,’” and none exist in sexual 
harassment law.132 The EEOC promulgated guidelines for 
prevention but, beyond requiring that employers develop a 
reporting system and train employees about sexual harassment, 
there is little meat to the regulation.133 So, as long as the policy is 
not utterly ineffectual or issued in bad faith, reasonable care is 
exercised simply by disseminating a sexual harassment policy.134 
Despite some recent movement towards examining an anti-
harassment program’s effectiveness,135 nothing incentivizes 
employers to do more than implement training and take complaints. 
 
 130. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778. 
 131. For an excellent survey of these cases, see Lawton, supra note 69, at 217–23. 
 132. Id. at 213. 
 133. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) 
(2019) (“An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment 
from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong 
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to 
raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and developing 
methods to sensitize all concerned.”). The EEOC’s policy guidance also presents few 
answers, stating an effective program should “include an explicit policy against 
sexual harassment that is clearly and regularly communicated to employees” and 
“encourage victims of harassment to come forward . . . .” Policy Guidance on Current 
Issues of Sexual Harassment, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (March 19, 1990), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html [https://perma.cc/9K62-K87W]. 
 134. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (1998); Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 
191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring complaint procedures as part of a policy); 
Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“Distribution of an anti-harassment policy provides ‘compelling proof’ that the 
company exercised reasonable care in preventing and promptly correcting sexual 
harassment . . . [t]he only way to rebut this proof is to show that the ‘employer 
adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy 
was otherwise defective or dysfunctional.’”); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 
1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 135. When New Jersey’s Supreme Court adopted the Ellerth/Faragher defense 
for its state’s anti-discrimination law, it very clearly stated that “an employer that 
implements an ineffective anti-harassment policy . . . may not assert the affirmative 
defense.” Aguas v. State, 107 A.3d 1250, 1268 (N.J. 2015) (responding to the dissent’s 
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One possible reason is a lack of alternatives. To many, the best 
an employer can realistically do is implement training. It was, for 
decades, logistically impossible to monitor every at-work 
interaction for potential harassment. But as the price point of 
artificial intelligence drops, the behavior necessary to satisfy 
reasonable care could change. Tort law regularly adjusts its 
standards of reasonable care to include the use of accessible 
technology, even when that technology is not customarily used by 
businesses.136 
 Judge Learned Hand famously advocated a mathematical 
approach to adjusting standards in tort law—courts should weigh 
costs against severity and likelihood of injury.137 And that may very 
well be the standard by which a court weighs the reasonableness of 
avoiding an AI-based system. Once costs are attainable and 
outweighed by injury, the standard could reasonably shift. A duty 
to monitor may become the clear standard by which fact-finders 
judge a preventative measure’s effectiveness. 
This conclusion would, in fact, align the standard more closely 
with agency law. The Second Restatement subjects principals to 
liability for failure to investigate and warn an agent of 
 
opinion that the defense allows employers to hide behind paper anti-discrimination 
policies). Subsequent decisions scrutinized effectiveness a bit more closely than is 
typically seen in federal cases. See Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters, 
118 A.3d 355, 362 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (finding that, while the employer 
did not seem to monitor the effectiveness of its policies, the fact that managers were 
proactive and “initiated contact with plaintiff before he uttered a complaint” showed 
the policy was not mere lip service); Smith v. Hutchinson Plumbing Heating Cooling, 
No. L-0992-12, 2015 WL 853040, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 2, 2015) 
(“[D]efendant’s proof of lack of training on the policy put its effectiveness in issue 
and precluded summary judgment to defendant on the basis of the affirmative 
defense.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (“What 
usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done 
is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or 
not.”); The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding tugboat operator 
liable for loss of cargo because they did not fit the boat with radio equipment that, 
while rarely used in the industry, would have given the boat notice of an impending 
storm); Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(“The ‘gravity of the resulting injury’ that would occur in the almost unthinkable 
event of a serious accident requires the owner of a nuclear facility, acting through its 
employees, to exercise extraordinary vigilance at all times.”); Donnell v. Cal. W. Sch. 
of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (“Depending on location, 
building configurations and technology, Cal Western may have the potential to 
influence or affect the condition of adjoining property or property at various 
distances from its own property. However, the existing legal standard does not 
require Cal Western to seek to exert such influence or effect wherever it may have 
such potential.”). 
 137. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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unreasonable risks at the worksite.138 The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) embodies this standard by imposing 
a general duty to monitor worksites and prevent hazardous 
conditions from developing.139 An AI program that makes 
monitoring for sexual harassment as easy as inspecting sites for 
hazardous conditions could prompt either the court or the EEOC to 
adopt a similar duty to monitor.140 
ii. Expanding a Duty to Warn 
An interesting side effect to the general blending of the 
employer’s dual-obligations to prevent and correct sexual 
harassment is the burgeoning appreciation of a “duty to warn.” The 
Restatement of Agency Law has noted a master has duty to warn 
their servant of imminent harm since 1958.141 It is not surprising, 
then, that some courts recognize an affirmative duty to warn about 
prior sexual harassment. In Paroline v. Unisys Corp., for example, 
the Fourth Circuit explored the different corrective measures a 
company could adopt to prevent a known harasser from harassing 
again.142 Normally, employers simply fire those who sexually harass 
 
 138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 471 (1958). 
 139. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2018); Metzler v. Arcadian Corp., No. 96-60126, 1997 
U.S. App. LEXIS 12693, at *12 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 1997) (“[F]ocus is on an employer’s 
duty to prevent hazardous conditions from developing in the employment itself or 
the physical workplace.”); Fabi Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 508 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D. 
C. Cir. 2007) (“To establish a violation of the General Duty Clause, the Secretary 
must establish that: (1) an activity or condition in the employer’s workplace 
presented a hazard to an employee, (2) either the employer or the industry 
recognized the condition or activity as a hazard, (3) the hazard was likely to or 
actually caused death or serious physical harm, and (4) a feasible means to eliminate 
or materially reduce the hazard existed.”). 
 140. OSHA and Title VII are more alike than one may think. Both have a 
preventative purpose. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2018) (“Congress declares it to be 
its purpose and policy . . . to assure so far as possible every working man and woman 
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions”), with Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (noting Title VII exists “to avoid harm.”); see also 
MacKinnon supra note 34, at 159 (laying the basis for finding sexual harassment as 
a form of sex discrimination and writing that sexual harassment could actually fall 
within the jurisdiction of OSHA). 
 141. Restat 2d of Agency, § 512 (1958) (“If a servant, while acting within the scope 
of his employment, comes into a position of imminent danger of serious harm and 
this is known to the master or to a person who has duties of management, the master 
is subject to liability for a failure by himself or by such person to exercise reasonable 
care to avert the threatened harm.”); see also Newman v. Redstone, 354 Mass. 379, 
382 (1968) (noting that, while older jurisprudence refused to recognize an affirmative 
duty to warn, “[t]he trend of modern authority . . . is to the contrary”); Paroline v. 
Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 112 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing a potential duty to 
warn). 
 142. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107 (noting that under certain circumstances, the court 
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others.143 But if they do not, the Paroline court held past behavior 
effectively creates constructive notice for future harassment.144 
Liability could thus attach if a prior-harasser is retained and 
harasses again, but the employer failed to warn the new victims.145 
Both the Second and Tenth circuits adopted similar versions of the 
rule, similarly reasoning that prior incidents effectively create 
constructive notice of future behavior.146 
This standard presents the same problem as before—it 
requires harassment of someone before triggering a duty. But it 
recognizes an employer’s preventative obligations, and more 
importantly lays a foundation for a duty to warn. An artificial 
intelligence program that monitors employee behavior to predict 
sexual harassment would create the same constructive notice as in 
 
may “impute liability, under certain circumstances, to an employer who failed to take 
steps to try to prevent sexual harassment of the plaintiff.”). 
 143. The Paroline court actually tied the plaintiff’s theory to one of negligent 
retention. Id. at 112. 
 144. Id. at 107 (“An employer’s knowledge that a male worker has previously 
harassed female employees other than the plaintiff will often prove highly relevant 
in deciding whether the employer should have anticipated that the plaintiff too 
would become a victim of the male employee’s harassing conduct.”). 
 145. Id. at 111 (“Paroline’s assertion that the company’s failure to warn caused 
her injury, as well as the fact that Moore met Paroline at work, might be grounds for 
holding that the injury arose out of her employment.”). Although the court did not 
expressly recognize a duty to warn, subsequent decisions clarified what the Fourth 
Circuit dubbed “the Paroline failure-to-warn theory.”  See Foster v. Univ. of Md.-
Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 255–56 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating that the rule 
“articulated in Paroline remains good law in this Circuit”). That court further 
explained that an employer has “an affirmative duty to prevent sexual harassment, 
and will be liable if they ‘anticipated or reasonably should have anticipated’ that a 
particular employee would sexual harass a particular coworker and yet ‘failed to take 
action reasonably calculated to prevent such harassment.’” Id. at 255.  However, “for 
purposes of the Paroline failure-to-warn theory, an employer may reasonably rely 
upon the findings of a state civil rights agency in determining whether an employee 
poses a risk of creating a hostile work environment”; thus, if a state agency found no 
evidence of wrongdoing, there is no affirmative obligation to warn.  Id. at 256.   
 146. Compare Hirase-Doi v. U.S. W. Commc’ns Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir. 
1995) (“We believe that US West may be put on notice if it learns that the perpetrator 
has practiced widespread sexual harassment in the office place, even though US 
West may not have known that this particular plaintiff was one of the perpetrator’s 
victims.”) and Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Delta 
had notice of Young’s proclivity to rape co-workers. The fact that Young’s prior rapes 
were not of Ferris but of other co-workers is not preclusive.”), with Longstreet v. Ill. 
Dep’t of Corr., 276 F.3d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to adopt a duty-to-warn 
standard and reasoning it would be unjust “that a response which seemed to be 
within the realm of reasonableness in one situation can, if ultimately it did not have 
the proper deterrent effect, be the sole basis for liability in another case even if the 
employer’s response in the second case was clearly sufficient.”). 
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Pauline, the employer would be obligated to not only investigate, 
but also correct the aberrant behavior. 
B. Duty to Investigate 
But assume no court ever expands an employer’s preventative 
duties. Instead, something a bit more plausible occurs; employers 
adopt a company-wide monitoring system for more selfish reasons. 
Lawsuits are expensive, and the company prefers to nip any 
potential issues in the bud before a complaint is filed.147 Or perhaps 
the company expands surveillance to protect its proprietary 
information.148 Could that trigger any affirmative obligations for 
the employer? 
There is no clear answer, but—depending on the information 
the AI reviews and the reports it sends to management—an 
employer might be obligated to investigate. Employers are duty-
bound “to take prompt corrective action that is ‘reasonably 
calculated to end the harassment’” once they receive notice of such 
behavior.149 Currently, both actual and constructive notice demands 
harassment occur before any duty is triggered. Actual notice 
manifests once a report is filed, while constructive notice exists 
when harassment “takes place so openly and frequently that the 
employer would be expected to have observed the conduct.”150 
 
 147. Courts are also willing to admit evidence of harassing comments about a 
plaintiff, even when the plaintiff is not present to hear them. See, e.g., Schwapp v. 
Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The district court also erred in 
failing to consider the eight additional [racially-charged] incidents that did not occur 
in Schwapp’s presence.”); Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (“a plaintiff may show that, while she was not personally subjected to 
harassing conduct, her working conditions were nevertheless altered as a result of 
witnessing a defendant’s hostility towards other women at the workplace.”); 
Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 336 (6th Cir. 2008) (“This court’s 
caselaw therefore makes clear that the factfinder may consider similar acts of 
harassment of which a plaintiff becomes aware during the course of his or her 
employment, even if the harassing acts were directed at others or occurred outside 
of the plaintiff’s presence.”). This evidentiary problem also incentivizes employers to 
fully monitor all chatter. 
 148. A system, not unlike the one described for sexual harassment, is being used 
for this exact purpose. Adam K. Levin, You’re Being Watched at Work, CHI. TRIB. 
(Apr. 16, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/success/tca-you-re-being-
watched-at-work-20180416-story.html [https://perma.cc/49QU-EL56]. 
 149. Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Burlington 
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775, 807 (1998). 
 150. J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 
VA. L. REV. 273, 317 (1995); see also Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d 
473, 478 (7th Cir. 2004) (“However, an employer could be charged with constructive 
notice where the harassment was sufficiently obvious.”). 
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Courts seem willing to stretch the ‘open and frequent’ element 
of constructive notice when an employer monitors its employee’s 
digital activity. The New Jersey Superior Court held in Blakey v. 
Continental Airlines that employers are not obligated to monitor e-
mails, but “may not disregard the posting of offensive messages on 
company or state agency e-mail systems when the employer is made 
aware of those messages.”151 
This obligation has expanded slightly post-Blakey. In Doe v. 
XYC Corp., the network administrator at a company that regularly 
monitored network activity for inappropriate behavior discovered 
an employee was visiting pornographic sites.152 The department 
performed a limited investigation but never reported the 
behavior.153 As it turned out, the employee was also visiting sites 
with child pornography, which the IT administrators could easily 
discover with a more extensive review.154 But it was not until the 
employee abused a co-worker’s child that anyone realized the extent 
of his behavior.155 The defendant claimed they had no idea he was 
accessing child pornography.156 However, the court imputed 
knowledge to the employer because “an investigation” of his illicit 
browsing “would have readily uncovered the full scope of 
Employee’s activities.”157 Since the company had constructive 
knowledge of this activity, it was obligated to report the behavior to 
the police and either terminate the employee or take some other 
“internal action to stop [the employee’s] activities.”158 
The old axiom that “hard cases make bad law” undoubtedly 
applies in this context. Viewing and creating child pornography is 
such a vile act that courts are more willing to push the boundaries 
of notice and duty. But there is a noticeable trend towards 
expanding the concept of notice when employers monitor an 
employee’s activity. If someone who is duty-bound to report 
harassment to their employer sees—or could easily access a report 
 
 151. Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 551 (N.J. 2000) (“That does not mean 
that employers have a duty to monitor employees’ mail. Grave privacy concerns are 
implicated . . . . It may mean that employers may not disregard the posting of 
offensive messages on company or state agency e-mail systems when the employer 
is made aware of those messages.”). 
 152. Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1161. 
 155. Id. at 1161–62. 
 156. Id. at 1162. 
 157. Id. at 1167. 
 158. Id. at 1167–68. 
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identifying—potential problems, the court might find the employer 
on notice.159 Notice rules “control incentives to invest in 
information.”160 Accurate information is worth investing in when it 
impacts the bottom-line.161 
Under the current regime, investing in harassment-
monitoring software is ill-advised since it might needlessly trigger 
investigations that would otherwise be unnecessary. However, as 
the cases out of New Jersey demonstrate, behavior both on and off 
a work terminal contribute equally to constructive notice. That 
creates an incentive to adopt a system that flags issues and permits 
corrective action. The risk-averse will want as comprehensive of a 
system as possible. 
C. The Thirst for Data 
Effective AI requires access to extraordinary amounts of 
data.162 Without that access, it is nearly impossible to identify 
patterns and predict behavior. And employers are uniquely situated 
as they can institute massive systems of surveillance otherwise 
frowned upon when done by most Americans.163 Courts do consider 
 
 159. Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 657 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(“Her Facebook post was not in accordance with Mercy’s otherwise flexible reporting 
system for sexual harassment complaints, and the post, by itself, did not provide any 
notice to Mercy. Only when Weaver himself brought the post to [the HR Director’s] 
attention did Mercy learn that, among many other complaints, Debord disliked 
Weaver’s ‘creepy hands.’”); see also Fisher v. Mermaid Manor Home for Adults, LLC, 
192 F. Supp. 3d 323, 329–30 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting an employer’s failure to take 
remedial action after seeing an Instagram post that “compar[ed] Plaintiff to a 
fictional chimpanzee from the Planet of the Apes movie, created a hostile work 
environment” as the employer “knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.”); 
Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Generally, 
for constructive notice to attach, the notice must ‘come to the attention of someone 
who . . . has under the terms of his employment . . . a duty to pass on the information 
to someone within the company who has the power to do something about 
it.’ . . . Once that person learns of the sexual harassment, the employer is considered 
to be on notice even if the victim never reported the harassment.”). 
 160. Verkerke, supra note 150, at 319. 
 161. This idea was recently explored by Kate Klonick. Kate Klonick, The New 
Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 1598 (2018). Klonick concluded that companies tend to self-regulate and push 
for accurate content because obscenity, inaccuracies, and violence threaten 
“potential profits based in advertising revenue.” Id. at 1627. 
 162. See generally GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 88 at 5–8 (noting that AI often 
need to be coded and experience their own learning to be most effective). 
 163. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act prohibits the interception of 
electronic data and communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2018). However, there is a 
carve-out for communications made on equipment furnished by a company to a user 
“in the ordinary course of its business.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (2018). 
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whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the 
method and manner of the invasion.164 But generally, as long as the 
employee is on notice and the business either owns the data or has 
an agreement permitting access to data held off-site, the only 
problems that stand in the way of permitting access are potential 
rather than concrete. 
i. Privacy Problems 
As mentioned in Section III, a predictive AI could potentially 
access publicly available information posted by employees. But 
there are a host of privacy concerns in such a program and, as there 
is an implicit right to privacy in the U.S. Constitution, courts may 
be wary about such an intrusive act.165 Currently, nothing prohibits 
employers from trawling public information. A handful of states 
statutorily restrict employers from requesting social media 
passwords,166 but generally, any information posted online is 
deemed public. 
Courts are typically unwilling to protect information in which 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.167 And once you 
release information publicly, you cannot reasonably expect it 
remain private.168 But, as the Supreme Court recognized in United 
States v. Jones, “[i]n the pre-computer age, the greatest protections 
of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but 
practical.”169 Now, “many ordinary Americans are choosing to make 
 
 164. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010) (“[T]he extent of an 
expectation [of privacy] is relevant to assessing whether the search was too 
intrusive.”). 
 165. Cf. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890) (discussing how the courts respond to claims of breach of privacy). 
 166. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40x 
(2019); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 55/10 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135 
(2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:5 (2019). 
 167. See United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2019) and Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 168. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). The 
First Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed a conviction for possession of child 
pornography based on photos the defendant posted to an online image board. United 
States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019). Morel argued that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy as to the images he uploaded, and the Government thus 
violated the Fourth Amendment by reviewing the images without a warrant. Id. at 
7–8. The Court disagreed, finding Morel had no “reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the images uploaded to Imgur” as “‘everyone in the world can see’ images uploaded 
to public Imgur albums, and that those images are available on Imgur’s public 
galleries.” Id. at 10. 
 169. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 
2020] Preventing #MeToo 99 
public much information that was seldom revealed to outsiders just 
a few decades ago,” but fail to realize the implications of that 
behavior.170 Something as innocuous as where someone ate lunch, 
or what they wore to the beach, “can lead to insights of a deeply 
sensitive nature,” thanks to pattern recognition and AI.171 
Of course, these Fourth Amendment cases do not constrain 
private employers.172 Rather, civil liability in tort law typically reins 
in abusive behavior.173 But a similar type of analysis applies in this 
context, as courts normally examine whether “a plaintiff reasonably 
expected that information about himself would remain ‘private’ 
after” disclosing it to other people.174 Though highly 
underdeveloped, the cases examining this issue typically turn on 
the affirmative acts the plaintiff-employee took to protect the posted 
information.175 
In Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean, for example, a nurse sued her 
ex-employer for invasion of privacy after the hospital terminated 
 
 170. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 171. Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 399, 420–21 (2017). 
 172. Some courts have analogized a party’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
enforceable against a private employer to the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Twigg v. Hercules 
Corp., 185 W. Va. 155, 159 (1990). But, generally, there is reticence to “transfer the 
jurisprudence of the cases involving government employers to actions against private 
employers.” Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 625 (3d Cir. 1992); see 
also Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tenn. 1997) (collecting case 
law holding “that constitutional guarantees restrain government conduct and 
generally do not restrain the conduct of private individuals.”); Whye v. Concentra 
Health Servs., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137142, at *59 (D. Md. Sep. 24, 2013) (rejecting 
an invasion of privacy argument based on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence after 
noting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an 
arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative.”) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989)). 
 173. Additionally, some states also have statutory protections for personal and 
private information. For example, California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), 
effective January 1, 2020, may require employers who adopt a system that combs 
and collects data about its employees to put those employees on notice of the practice. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2019). 
 174. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 919, 921 (2005). 
 175. See, e.g., Meyers v. Siddons-Martin Emergency Grp. LLC, No. 16-1197, 2016 
WL 5337959, at *3–*4 (E.D. La. Sep. 23, 2016) (dismissing an invasion of privacy 
claim brought against the plaintiff’s former employer after the plaintiff was 
terminated for offensive Facebook posts discovered after the employee logged into 
his account “on a computer that was owned by Siddons-Martin,” as that act removed 
any “reasonable expectation of privacy” he had over his posts); Ehling v. Monmouth-
Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (D.N.J. 2012). 
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her, in part, for a controversial statement she made on Facebook.176 
Ehling premised her claim on the fact the post was not public; 
rather, anyone who was not “invited to be her Facebook 
‘friend,’ . . . could not access and view postings on [her] Facebook 
‘wall.’”177 Monmouth-Ocean moved to dismiss, arguing anyone she 
added as a Friend could read the post, and thus she never expected 
it to remain private.178 The court denied the motion, finding the fact 
Ehling “actively took steps to protect her Facebook page from public 
viewing” shows she could have “had a reasonable expectation that 
her Facebook posting would remain private.”179 However, courts 
have also found even the simple act of posting waives any 
expectation of privacy, as there is always a possibility those within 
the protected space could share the information with others.180 As 
the Ehling court notes, “reasonableness (and offensiveness) are 
highly fact-sensitive inquiries.”181 
What analysts can glean from the case law, however, is that 
an employee who expects information posted publicly—i.e. not just 
accessible to friends and followers, but anyone with an internet 
connection—to remain private is living in a fantasy. But trying to 
peek behind the curtain separating the public from a user’s limited 
world of friends and followers might be a step too far. 
ii. The Cost of Litigation and Fear 
The system this article envisions is supposed to warn; not 
accuse. But that distinction gets murky when straddling the line 
 
 176. Ehling, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 369–370. 
 177. Id. at 370. 
 178. Id. at 372. 
 179. Id. at 374. 
 180. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[W]e 
do not find a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily 
made by an employee to his supervisor over the company e-mail system 
notwithstanding any assurances that such communications would not be intercepted 
by management. Once plaintiff communicated the alleged unprofessional comments 
to a second person (his supervisor) over an e-mail system which was apparently 
utilized by the entire company, any reasonable expectation of privacy was lost.”); 
Heldt v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 16-cv-885-BAS-NLS, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25315, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2019) (granting summary judgment on an 
invasion of privacy claim brought against a private insurer who disclosed 
information gleaned from the plaintiff’s social media page to an insurance 
investigator as the plaintiff “voluntarily shared the information with his Facebook 
friends knowing there is a possibility that his friends could share the information 
with others,” and thus “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
information.”). 
 181. Ehling, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 374. 
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between truth and probability. Interestingly, leaked data alone 
should not cause any problems. The data fed into this system is, 
again, public facing.182 Anyone with an internet connection could 
find and review that information; the system just aggregates it into 
one place.183 Rather, the ‘red-flag’ or warning itself is what 
threatens the most harm to someone’s reputation if leaked. 
Defamation claims are the common road to redress 
reputational harm. The warning—“Harvey has a 90% likelihood of 
sexually harassing Sally”—seems to state, or at least imply, a 
fact.184 Truth remains the absolute defense to defamation, though it 
is difficult to argue a warning or probability is entirely truthful. 
And, while you could explain how the probability was reached based 
on true information, doing so requires cracking the proprietary 
black box protecting algorithmic programs. Very few companies 
would sacrifice their secrets to help defend against a defamation 
suit brought against one client.185 
It is more likely that—rather than argue truth—employers 
would instead rely on the qualified “common interest” privilege186 
that normally helps sink the (admittedly rare) defamation suits 
 
 182. Problems could arise, of course, if the information used by the system is not 
public. There would be some interplay between an employee’s private information, 
as maintained by human resources, and the public facing information compiled for 
the system’s analysis. And some states mandate that businesses protect their 
employees’ private information. In California, for example, employers must 
“implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices” to 
safeguard its employees’ “personal information.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (2019). 
 183. As discussed supra Section IV.C.i, employees face an uphill battle if arguing 
information they posted publicly on social media must remain private. 
 184. Even if it is more opinion than fact, “[a] defamatory communication may 
consist of a statement in the form of an opinion . . . if it implies the allegation of 
undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 566 (1979). Unless the public knows and understands how an early-
warning system like the one envisioned by this article works, they could reasonably 
assume the probability is based on prior acts of harassments, which may or may not 
exist. 
 185. This issue has arisen already with programs used for criminal sentencing. 
Eric Loomis was sentenced to six years in prison because “[COMPAS],” a proprietary 
algorithm used in sentencing, believed he had a high risk of recidivism. See Adam 
Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 
1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-softwa
re-programs-secret-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/Q29M-FQS2]. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court upheld the sentence, reasoning that while Loomis “cannot review 
and challenge how the COMPAS algorithm calculates risk, he can at least review 
and challenge the resulting risk scores set forth in the report.” State v. Loomis, 881 
N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wis. 2016). 
 186. Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Court’s Wake-
Up Call for Women, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 457, 509 (2002). 
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brought by accused-harassers. While defamation law varies from 
state-to-state, that privilege generally protects intra-company 
communications between employees who share a common interest 
in the subject, such as a human resources department concerned 
about sexual harassment.187 A warning spat out by the system to 
human resources likely falls in the realm of intra-company 
messaging.188 However, employers lose that privilege when they 
‘excessively’ publish the communication.189 And that is where a 
potential leak could be hazardous. Recognizing that some leaks are 
inevitable, courts examining an excessive publication challenge 
tend to review what an employer did to keep the alleged defamatory 
information within the proper channels.190 
Inevitably, creative plaintiffs will find other avenues for 
vindicating reputational harm caused by an early-warning system. 
The Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), despite its title, 
covers more than credit, encompassing “any written, oral, or other 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency 
bearing on a consumer’s . . . character, general reputation, [or] 
 
 187. Id. at 508 (exploring the effect of a qualified privilege, as well as other 
defenses, on defamation suits rooted in sexual harassment accusations within 
various jurisdictions). 
 188. California has even codified the qualified privilege if the communication 
pertains to alleged sexual harassment. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (2019) (explaining the 
privilege applies “to and includes a complaint of sexual harassment,” as well as a 
prior employer’s “decision to not rehire” an employee “based upon the employer’s 
determination that the former employee engaged in sexual harassment.”). 
 189. West, supra note 186, at 510 (“Another possible way for a terminated 
employee to prove abuse of the privilege protecting an employer’s workplace 
communications is to prove ‘excessive publication’—that the employer distributed 
the allegedly defamatory information outside the workplace.”). 
 190. Garziano v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 393 (5th Cir. 
1987) (remanding a case for the fact-finder to determine whether rumors about an 
employee’s termination for alleged sexual harassment were “the product of 
supervisors discussing the contents of” an internal communication concerning the 
reasons for the termination “with persons outside the ‘circle’ of interested employees, 
or whether the rumors were only routine scuttlebutt due to Garziano’s discharge.”); 
Esmark Apparel v. James, 10 F.3d 1156, 1163 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding “minor leaks” 
caused by supervisors sharing the reasons the company terminated an employee 
with “their immediate families” did not evidence “that the company . . . abuse[d] its 
qualified privilege through excessive publication”); Tacka v. Georgetown Univ., 193 
F. Supp. 2d 43, 51 (D.C. 2001) (“[Q]ualified privilege may be lost . . . ‘if the 
publication occurs outside normal channels, is otherwise excessive, or was made with 
malicious intent.’”) (quoting District of Columbia v. Thompson, 570 A.2d 277, 292 
(D.C. 1990)); White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass. 809 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 
(2004) (holding that the qualified privilege protecting intra-company communication 
is “lost only when the employer recklessly makes ‘unnecessary, unreasonable or 
excessive’ publications”). 
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personal characteristics” collected for “employment purposes.”191 
That includes “evaluating a consumer for employment, promotion, 
reassignment or retention as an employee.”192 
Indeed, some have already challenged broad ‘risk assessments’ 
collected for, and produced to, their employers. A technician who 
worked for Superior, a third-party installation company, brought 
one such claim in Ernst v. Dish Network, LLC.193 Dish Network, the 
named-defendant, contracted to have Superior technicians install 
satellite dishes for Dish’s customers.194 As part of this arrangement, 
Dish required that Superior run criminal background checks on 
their employees and forward Dish a “summary report” with “the 
individual’s risk rating” denoted as “‘high risk,’ ‘low risk,’ or 
‘review.’”195 “High risk” employees, like Ernst, were forbidden from 
installing equipment.196 He sued Dish, arguing he had a right to 
inspect and correct the report under the FCRA.197 The court 
concluded “[a] ‘high risk’ rating on the Summary Report in effect 
says that [Plaintiff] . . . has done something highly improper that 
impugns his moral character.”198 And because Ernst’s employer 
“used the information in the Summary Report . . . for ‘reassignment 
or retention as an employee,’” it was subject to the FCRA.199 
As Ernst shows, there is no defense to an FCRA action just 
because another entity compiled the report, or the report just 
summarizes the information actually collected. Any adopters of an 
early-warning system should thus strongly consider producing a 
copy of any reports generated to impacted employees. 
Unfortunately, this practice could result in higher amounts of self-
censorship as people try to ‘correct’ their ranking by meeting with 
fewer opposite sex colleagues, or avoiding mentorship-relationships 
 
 191. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2018). Some states have adopted their own versions 
of the FCRA. California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) 
requires anyone evaluating publicly-available information concerning a consumer’s 
“character, general reputation, personnel characteristics, or mode of living, for 
employment purposes” to disclose such information “within seven days after receipt,” 
even when the entity forgoes “the services of an investigative consumer reporting 
agency.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.53 (2019). 
 192. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(h) (2018). 
 193. Ernst v. Dish Network, LLC, 49 F. Supp. 3d 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 194. Id. at 379. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 378. 
 198. Id. at 382. 
 199. Id. at 384 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(h) (2018)). 
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with their subordinates.200 The risk of litigation and ensuing side 
effects of a massive surveillance effort may prove too high for 
implementation. Only time will tell. 
V. “Looks Like You’ve Had a Bit Too Much to Think!”: 
Conclusions 
 
“We shall meet in the place where there is no darkness.”201 
 
Consider the following an example. There will be, in the not so 
distant future, a man named Harvey. 202 Harvey will run a fairly 
successful public relations firm with lots of employees, including a 
young lady named Sally. Sally will be twenty-one years old, fresh 
out of college, and dream of running her own PR firm. Harvey will 
take a liking to Sally and offer her an internship. He lets his Human 
Resources director Jim know about the new hire and provides a 
basic rundown of her job—Sally will shadow Harvey, watch him run 
everything, and generally help out around the office. Jim puts these 
variables into ‘The Eye;’ a handy system that generally monitors 
employee activity and flags potential problems for Jim to review. 
At first, there are no real issues—’The Eye’ flags the power 
differential between Harvey and Sally, but only predicts a 15% 
chance of harassment. However, it began noticing some odd 
behavior from Harvey’s work-terminal. Her name kept appearing 
in his search history; they tend to clock in and out at around the 
same time, even when Harvey stays well past closing; and recently 
he started interacting with images Sally posted years ago wherein 
she is wearing revealing clothes.203 It sends Jim a warning—Harvey 
is now a high-risk harasser. Jim prints out the report and calls 
Harvey into his office. He explains how sensitive these matters are, 
and lets Harvey know ‘The Eye’ thinks there may be a problem. He 
provides Harvey a copy of his report and cautions him to stay away 
 
 200. Steve Hendrix, Ellie Silverman & Marc Fisher, #MeToo has a ‘Chilling Effect’ 
on Workplace Camaraderie, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune
.com/business/ct-metoo-workplace-camaraderie-20180128-story.html [https://perma
.cc/Z5EP-XQ5U]; see also Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 
(2003) (discussing the effect of sex in the workplaces). 
 201. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 25 (Harcourt Inc. 1977) (1949). 
 202. Names, characters, businesses, places, events, locales, and incidents are 
purely products of the author’s imagination. Any resemblance to eventual persons, 
living or dead, or eventual events is entirely coincidental. 
 203. This feature sold Jim; AI analyzes pixel by pixel, compares it to publicly 
available images on the internet of similar skin hue, determines to 99% probability 
how many pixels are of skin and how many are clothes, then assesses risk based on 
how many pictures are being liked of someone half-naked. 
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from Sally. Harvey is annoyed by this—Sally was a nice girl and he 
thought they had a real connection—but he agrees and heads back 
to his office. 
Sally notices Harvey seemed a bit more stand-offish than 
usual, so she decides to help out by tidying up early the next 
morning. While sorting the paperwork in his office, Sally sees the 
report—‘Harvey, CEO; 93% Risk Against Sally; Intervention 
MANDATORY.’ Sally could not believe her eyes. She felt betrayed; 
Harvey wanted to harass her! She took a picture of the report and 
sent it to her friend Jenny, a journalist working on a report 
exploring sexual harassment in the modern workplace. Jenny posts 
a copy of the report to her blog, and tags everyone she can to out 
Harvey as a harasser. 
Sexual harassment law is failing the harassed. It was designed 
to prevent harassment but cannot protect a victim until they are 
actually harmed. As this paper explored, artificial intelligence could 
be the key to this problem. As long as the program is tailored to 
consider subjective experience, a company could step in and prevent 
harm before it ever occurs. Such a system could even capture, 
organize, and centralize all of the rumors and complaints that swirl 
around a company. 
The tricky parts are what employers do with the information 
and how employees view the system. Employers should not take any 
adverse action unless harassment actually occurs. These warnings 
should instead simply prompt an investigation and discussion. 
Instead of seeing these reports or scores as accusations, they should 
be framed the same as credit scores. Having a low credit score does 
not make you a bad person—it simply changes your risk profile. And 
once you know your score is low, either because you were called into 
human resources or you received a copy of the report, you can work 
on making it better. Small, incremental adjustments in attitude and 
perception can go a long way in promoting empathy and cutting 
back on harassment. 
 
